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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Kalynn and Charles Jones appeal from an Order Re: Attorney Fees entered 
on March 20, 2008, and from the final order and judgment entered by Judge 
Douglas B. Thomas on April 29, 2008. This Court has jurisdiction by assignment 
from the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: The trial court disregarded the parties' contract allowing attorney's 
fees against the "defaulting party" and ruled that the reciprocal attorney's fee 
provision of Utah Code § 78B-5-826 superseded the parties' agreement and 
allowed attorney's fees to the "prevailing party". Did the trial court incorrectly 
disregard the contract and misinterpret the statute? 
Where Preserved: Plaintiffs' Objection and Motion to Strike: Affidavit 
of Sonny Olsen for Attorney's Fees (Rl 13); Notice of Appeal (R142). 
Standard of Review: Attorney fee decisions that involve questions of 
law or statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness.1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is of central importance to this appeal: 
78B-5-826. Attorney fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails 
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or 
1
 AX. & R. Whipple Pluming and Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270, 272 (Utah 2004). 
See also Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1044 (Utah 2007). 
1 
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one 
party to recover attorney fees. 
Utah Code § 78B-5-826 (2008) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
On January 9, 2007, Appellants Charles and Kalynn Jones ("Jones") filed 
their complaint against Paul and Tammy Riche ("Riche") seeking damages for 
breach of contract and waste arising out of a landlord/tenant rental contract 
(R001). On January 22, 2007, Riche filed their answer and counterclaim to the 
Jones complaint (R012). Riche's answer included fourteen "affirmative" defenses 
and their counterclaim consisted of two causes of action against Jones—fraud and 
unjust enrichment (R012). On February 13, 2008, a jury trial was conducted on all 
of Jones's causes of action and all of Riche's defenses and counterclaim causes of 
action (R078). The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Jones on all counts 
and determined Jones's damages to be $1,662.00 (R099). 
The jury determined that Riche had breached the parties' contract and had 
committed waste (R099). The jury also determined that the acts of waste 
committed by Riche were willful (R099). Additionally, the jury determined that 
Riche's counterclaims were unsupported, finding no liability for fraud or unjust 
enrichment against Jones (R099). 
On March 6, 2008, Jones objected to Riche's request for attorney's fees and 
the trial court's proposed award of attorney's fees to Riche (Rl 13). The objection 
was based upon the following: 1) the parties contract required an award of 
2 
attorney's fees against the "defaulting party," 2) the trial court did not have 
discretion to disregard the parties' contract in awarding attorney's fees, and 3) 
case law relied upon by the trial court when contemplating an award of attorney's 
fees to Riche did not apply to this case (Rl 13). 
On March 17, 2008, the trial court entered its order awarding attorney's 
fees to Riche (R134). The trial court relied upon Utah Code § 78-27-56.5 
(recodified as 78B-5-826) and determined that the statute "allows the court to 
award attorney's fees to the prevailing party when the action is based on a written 
contract that contains an attorneys fees provision" (R134). The trial court then 
determined that, although Riche had lost each of their causes of action and Jones 
had prevailed on their complaint and been awarded a money judgment, that the 
Riches were the "prevailing party" because Jones had not recovered the full 
amount of damages requested at trial (R134). 
On April 29, 2008, the trial court entered its final order and judgment, 
including the award of attorney's fees (R139, R141). Notice of Appeal was timely 
filed on May 23, 2008 (R142). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the 
Court of Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to award attorney's 
fees in strict accordance with the contractual language of the parties' written 
contract. The jury determined that Riche breached the contract and willfully 
committed waste to the leased premises. Under the contract, the trial court was 
3 
required to award attorney's fees, if any, against Riche as the "defaulting party," 
and the trial court refused to do so. Instead, the trial court awarded attorney's fees 
against Jones in contravention of the plain contract language. 
The trial court erred by applying Utah Code § 78B-5-826 in this case. 
The statute authorizes a reciprocal right to attorney fees in one-sided contracts 
where provision is made for attorney fees to only one party. However, in this 
case, the trial court was obligated to look first to the terms of the written contract 
and strictly enforce the parties' agreement. The reciprocal right to attorney's fees 
was never at issue in this case because the contract language applied equally to 
both parties. Moreover, the trial court plainly misinterpreted the language of the 
statute by ruling that the statute allowed the court to disregard the parties' contract 
and award attorney's fees under a "prevailing party" standard in all cases. 
Finally, the trial court erred by ruling that Riche was the prevailing party 
where Riche lost each cause of action and affirmative defense presented to the jury 
and where Jones prevailed on all causes of action pleaded in the Complaint. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
RULED THAT § 78B-5-826 SUPERSEDED THE NEGOTIATED TERMS 
OF THE PARTIES' CONTRACT. 
A. Attorney's fees must be awarded in strict accordance with the terms of the 
contract if a bilateral contract provision existed between the parties. 
Attorney's fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right that arises 
from a contract or statute. Where fees are provided for by contract, they are 
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract.3 Moreover, when 
authorized by contract, attorney's fees are not subject to an equitable standard of 
evaluation by the court because they are awarded as a matter of legal right.4 
Accordingly, since the right is contractual, the court does not have the same 
equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees as it does when applying a statute that 
allows for discretion.5 Therefore, the provisions in contracts that allow for 
attorney's fees ".. .should ordinarily be honored by the courts."6 
In Foote, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the clause in the parties' 
contract providing that "the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue.. .in pursuing any 
remedy provided.. .by applicable law."7 The Court held that under the language of 
that particular contract, the amount of plaintiff s recovery in the case was 
2
 Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). 
'Id. 
4
 Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
5
 Id. 
6
 Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
1
 Foote at 54. 
5 
irrelevant and the particular contract did not require any evaluation of the parties' 
success in the action brought to remedy a default.8 Instead, the Court expressly 
rejected the type of analysis utilized by the trial court in this case and advised that 
the "sole criterion for the plaintiff to obtain attorney fees .. .is to show default by 
the other contract party."9 
Importantly, in that case, the trial court found no compensable damages to 
plaintiffs from the breach of contract and awarded only $100.00.10 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court held that $100.00 was not nominal damages and upheld the award 
of attorney's fees.11 The Court explained that nominal damages are a trivial sum 
awarded to a plaintiff whose legal rights were invaded but who had not proven any 
actual damages and expressly held that $100.00 was not a nominal sum.12 The 
Court also reaffirmed the purpose of awarding attorney's fees—"to reasonably 
compensate counsel for their time reasonably expended in pursuing the underlying 
case in accordance with the authorizing contract,. ."13 
In this case, the parties' lease agreements utilize the same "defaulting 
party" language as Foote. Both lease agreements provide: 
"In the event of default by either party under this Agreement, the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses of enforcing the 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id at 54-55. 
10/</at 57-58. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. 
13
 Id at 56 (Emphasis Added). 
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same, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred, whether or not 
suit has been filed and whether incurred for or after judgment."14 
The jury specifically determined that Riches were in breach of contract and 
had committed waste in violation of the contract— twice finding that they were 
the "defaulting party" for purposes of the contract. Jones, on the other hand, were 
not a "defaulting party" in this case. Instead, Jones prevailed on each of their 
causes of action and also prevailed on each of Riche's causes of action. Jones was 
ultimately awarded a compensatory judgment against Riche in the amount of 
$1662.00—far in excess of the $100.00 discussed mFoote. 
In virtually all respects, the important analysis for this case is precisely the 
same as that in Foote. The contract authorizes an award of attorney's fees against 
the "defaulting party" which, according to the jury, is Riche. Significantly, even 
though a large compensatory damage award was determined by the jury in this 
case, the ultimate damages awarded is irrelevant because the contract does not 
require—or even permit—such an evaluation. Instead, the only criterion required 
for Jones to obtain attorney's fees is a finding that Riche defaulted and the jury has 
made that determination. The trial court plainly erred by disregarding the 
language of the parties' contract and refusing to award attorney's fees in favor of 
Jones. The award of attorney's fees against Jones was even more misdirected 
because Jones was never a "defaulting party" under the contract. 
14
 R158 Lease Agreements; R001 at Exhibit "A" paragraph 20 and Exhibit UB" 
paragraph 20; 
7 
Jones had a contractual legal right to an award of attorney's fees after the 
jury determined that Riche was in default. The trial court could not refuse to 
honor that contractual right and the ruling should be reversed. 
B. Utah Code § 78B-5-826 applies only after a determination that a contract 
unilaterally awards attorney's fees—it does not supersede the parties' 
agreement in every case. 
In awarding attorney's fees to Riche, the trial court deviated from 
established precedent in two ways. First, the trial court attempted to exercise 
equitable authority to adopt the "flexible and reasoned approach" to awarding 
attorney's fees in this case where only one party was successful on its claims. 
Second, the court wholly disregarded the parties contract and ruled (albeit by 
incorrectly stating the statutory language), that the reciprocal attorney's fee statute 
superseded the contract language and converted the contractual language to a 
"prevailing party" analysis in all cases. 
L The "flexible and reasonable approach "for attorney's 
fees is not controlling law in this case. 
In Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, the Utah Supreme Court 
evaluated contract language involving the term "successful party" to determine if 
"successful party" was the same as "prevailing party."15 However, the facts of that 
case and its predecessors were unique. All cases involved multiple parties and 
multiple claims. Importantly, in all cases, multiple parties prevailed on at least 
15
 Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270 (Utah 2004). 
8 
some of their claims.16 Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court was tasked to 
determine how to allocate attorney's fees m cases where there were multiple 
winners. 
Whipple is not factually similar to this case. Unlike Whipple, in this case, 
only Jones had success on the claims. Admittedly, Jones recovered less at trial 
than requested of the jury. However, a significant compensatory judgment was 
still awarded. The recovery of less than the amount requested may be important 
when detennining what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee for Jones, but it was 
unreasonable for the trial court to go so far as to award fees to Riches when they 
lost all claims. 
2. The reciprocal attorney 'sfee statute does not apply. 
The trial court ruled that despite the parties' contract, Utah Code § 78B-5-
826 "allows the court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party when the 
action is based on a written contract that contains an attorneys fees provision."17 
The trial court's written ruling clearly misstates the language of the statute by 
failing to acknowledge that the statute merely creates a "reciprocal" right of 
recovery and that the language specifically applies to contracts where "at least one 
party" is authorized by contract to recover attorney's fees. Importantly, the courts 
have repeatedly interpreted the statute to apply only in cases of one-sided contract 
provisions. 
16
 Id. 
17
 R134. 
9 
Notably, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the statute in this manner by 
looking first at the contract to determine whether a contracting party had a 
1 O 
contractual right to recover attorney's fees. In Bilanzich, the Court first 
determined that Bilanzich had no contractual right to attorney's fees because the 
contract provided only for fees to the opposing party in the event of a lawsuit.19 
Only after that determination was made did the court turn to the reciprocal 
attorney fee statute. Importantly, the Court also reviewed the policies and pointed 
out that the legislative intent of the statute was to". , .provide a level playing filed 
for parties to a contractual dispute" by allowing both parties to recover and to 
remedy the risks of uneven litigation created by adhesion-type contracts. 
Clearly, the statute was designed for cases where only one side would benefit from 
a contract clause in the event of litigation—and the courts have uniformly 
interpreted the statute to apply only in cases such as that. 
In this case, the attorney's fee provision was plainly bilateral and applied 
equally to both parties. The trial court's determination that the statute supersedes 
the contract language to apply a prevailing party standard in all contracts is in 
contravention of this Court's prior rulings and the intent of the statute. To adopt 
the trial court's analysis would be to nullify all contractual provisions relating to 
"Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1045 (Utah 2007). 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id at 1046. 
10 
attorney's fees by forcing a prevailing party analysis in all cases and there is no 
legal authority supporting the trial court's ruling. 
C. Riches were not the prevailing party in this case even under the trial court's 
misinterpretation. 
The jury specifically determined that Riches were in breach of contract and 
had committed waste. The jury further determined that none of Riche's causes of 
action were supported against Jones. Despite those determinations, the trial court 
determined that Riche was the "prevailing party" because Jones did not recover all 
of the damages requested at trial. The trial court's ruling on this issue is absurd. 
In analyzing the prevailing party standard, the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
prior case analysis stating, ".. .determining the prevailing party for purposes of 
awarding fees can oftentimes be quite simple.. .[w]here a plaintiff sues for money 
damages, and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if defendant 
successfully defends and avoids adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed."21 
Despite the straightforward analysis that would have easily applied to this 
case, the trial court confused the group of cases, including Whipple, where 
multiple claims were maintained by all parties and all parties had some measure of 
success on their claims. 
In this case, however, only Jones prevailed. Although the trial court 
minimized Riche's failure to prosecute or support their counterclaim at trial, the 
21
 R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119, 1126 (Utah 2002). 
22
 R134 at paragraph 3. 
11 
fact that the Riche counterclaims were presented to the jury is significant. Riche's 
total failure of proof on their own claims certainly does not aid them to become 
the prevailing party. 
Accordingly, even under the prevailing party standard, the trial court ruled 
incorrectly. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's 
award of attorney's fees and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to 
enter an award of attorney fees against Riche and in favor of Appellants. 
Appellants also request their costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
J 
SUBMITTED this ^ day of November, 2008. 
By: jjMy/Wg*^ 
Don M. Torgerson 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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